HEICO HEI

Reference table

1. What they actually sell — the two segments, with real numbers

HEICO runs two segments. Fiscal years end 31 October.

The FSG step-change is visible in the history. FSG went $1.255B (FY2022) to $1.770B (FY2023) to $2.639B (FY2024, plus 49.1%) to $3.117B (FY2025). That FY2024 jump is the Wencor acquisition annualising — the cash flow statement shows $2.422B of acquisitions in FY2023 funded by $2.163B of net debt issuance. It was the largest capital-allocation decision in the file and it worked.

Geographic mix (FY2025): North America $2.776B (61.9%), Non-US $1.709B (38.1%). Non-US grew 18.9% versus North America at 14.7% — international is the faster leg. (Note: the segment labels changed between FY2023 and FY2024, from "Other Countries" to "Non-US", so the pre-FY2024 comparison is not exactly like-for-like.)

2. The moat — and the most interesting thing in this dive

The knowledge base contains a genuinely non-obvious explanation of why HEICO's economics persist, and it is worth stating in full because it is also the reason the Exponential score is only 4.

Business Breakdowns, 2024-03-31, conviction 75: "HEICO's prisoner's-dilemma strategy caps PMA share at ~30% and avoids life-limited parts, so OEMs stay rational and don't cut price."

And its companion, same source and date, conviction 75: "HEICO undercuts OEMs 30-40%, widening the discount over time by not raising price, which deepens cost savings and customer lock-in."

Put those together and you have the whole model. HEICO's parts are cheaper. It does not raise price, so the discount widens every year, which deepens customer dependence. And it refuses to take more than about 30% of any part's market, because at higher penetration the OEM's rational response flips from "tolerate it" to "cut price and kill it." HEICO is voluntarily leaving revenue on the table to preserve the price umbrella it lives under.

That is an extraordinarily durable structure — and it is also a self-imposed ceiling. Most moats are about taking more share. This one is about taking exactly enough.

The other moat components, from the same source block:

• "Over 80M parts sold with zero service bulletins, airworthiness directives, or in-flight shutdowns — a quality record no OEM can match." (conviction 70, fact-tagged)
• "HEICO outperforms in rough industry environments as airlines cut costs and face supply-chain crunches, driving PMA adoption on both price and availability." (conviction 70) — the counter-cyclicality argument.
• "HEICO's electronics group (ETG) is like analog semis but less cyclical/less growth — diversified mission-critical components at 30%+ defense margins, non-cyclical." (conviction 65)

Moat: wide, durable and deliberately self-limiting.

3. The Q2 FY2026 acceleration — and the number that says it's real

This is the strongest operating quarter in the dataset and it deserves its own arithmetic.

The number that matters most: incremental operating margin. Operating income rose $98.52M on $277.89M of additional revenue — an incremental operating margin of 35.5%, against an FY2025 company average of 22.7%. Thirteen points of positive spread.

Why that specific number is load-bearing. The bear case on any serial acquirer is that growth is bought rather than earned, and that acquired revenue dilutes margins. A 35.5% incremental margin is the opposite signature — it means the marginal dollar of revenue is far more profitable than the average dollar, which acquired distribution businesses do not deliver. This is the strongest available evidence in the dataset that the FY2026 acceleration has a genuine operating component.

Half-year FY2026: revenue $2.555B versus $2.128B, plus 20.1%; EPS $3.01 versus $2.32, plus 29.7%.

And the beat record is perfect across the file — HEICO beat consensus EPS in all five reported quarters: $1.66 vs $1.33, $1.35 vs $1.28, $1.33 vs $1.22, $1.26 vs $1.13, $1.12 vs $1.03. That matters for section 6, because it argues the out-year consensus deceleration may be too conservative.

4. The serial-acquirer question — what the data does and does not show

The task frame for HEICO is organic versus acquired growth and incremental margins. Here is what is verifiable and what is not.

What the dataset does NOT contain: HEICO's organic-versus-acquired revenue split. It is not disclosed in this file. We are not going to estimate it. Any dive that gives you a precise organic growth rate for HEICO from this dataset is inventing it.

What the dataset DOES show:

Read it straight. In a normal year HEICO redeploys roughly three-quarters of its free cash flow into acquisitions — $629.83M against $861.38M in FY2025. Dividends took just $31.97M and buybacks $22.39M. This is a compounding machine that reinvests almost everything, and the capital-allocation record is the reason the knowledge base rates management at conviction 85.

The honest triangulation. FY2025 revenue grew $627M ($3.858B to $4.485B) while the company spent $629.83M on acquisitions. That coincidence does not mean growth was 100% acquired — acquisitions close mid-year and contribute partial revenue, and the multiple paid is unknown. But it does mean a meaningful share of headline growth is bought, and the file cannot tell you how much. The offsetting evidence — the 35.5% incremental operating margin in Q2 FY2026 — is what argues the organic component is substantial. That is as far as the data honestly goes.

The balance-sheet consequence, which is the real cost of the model:

• Goodwill $3.662B plus intangibles $1.471B = $5.133B, or 60.4% of the $8.500B asset base (km_ttm confirms 61.6% TTM).
• Tangible book value per share: NEGATIVE $3.73. Tangible asset value: negative $520.97M.
• Return on tangible assets is 21.5% versus return on assets of 8.2% — the gap is entirely the acquired intangibles.

None of that is a problem while the deals work. It becomes a problem the moment a large acquisition is impaired, and it is why P/B of 10.5x is not a meaningful valuation anchor for this name.

5. Financials — the receipts

• Revenue: FY2025 $4.485B (+16.3%); FY2024 $3.858B (+30.0%); FY2023 $2.968B (+34.4%); FY2022 $2.208B; FY2021 $1.866B; FY2020 $1.787B. Five-year CAGR: 20.2%.
• Profitability: FY2025 gross profit $1.786B (39.8% margin), operating income $1.019B (22.7%), EBITDA $1.220B (27.2%), net income $690.38M (15.4%), diluted EPS $4.90. Net income five-year CAGR 17.1%.
• Margin trajectory: operating margin 21.1% (FY2020) → 21.2% (FY2021) → 22.1% (FY2022) → 21.8% (FY2023) → 21.6% (FY2024) → 22.7% (FY2025) → 25.5% in Q2 FY2026. Stable for years, then inflecting.
• Cash flow: FY2025 operating cash flow $934.27M, capex -$72.89M, free cash flow $861.38M. FCF-to-net-income conversion 125%. Capex is 1.6% of revenue — an asset-light business that does not need to build factories to grow. Stock-based compensation $34.38M (0.6% of revenue), which is negligible and worth noting given how many "quality compounders" are not.
• Balance sheet (2025-10-31): cash $217.78M, inventory $1.295B, total current assets $2.356B, goodwill $3.662B, intangibles $1.471B, total assets $8.500B, total current liabilities $832.00M, long-term debt $2.165B, total debt $2.194B, equity $4.305B, minority interest $73.86M. Net debt $1.976B = 1.62x FY2025 EBITDA (TTM measure 1.74x). Current ratio 2.92x. TTM interest coverage 9.0x.
• Returns: TTM ROE 17.8%, ROIC 10.9%, ROCE 13.3%, return on tangible assets 21.5%.
• Dividend: $0.25 per share TTM, a 0.069% yield at $360.44, payout 4.2%. Effectively a token — HEICO retains capital to compound, which is the correct policy for this business.

Dual-class caveat, and it affects every multiple above. The reported market capitalisation of $50.216B at $360.44 implies 139.32M shares, against FY2025 weighted diluted shares of 140.77M. HEICO has two listed classes — Common (HEI) and Class A (HEI.A). This dataset contains no HEI.A price. If Class A trades at a discount to Common, as dual-class B-share structures typically do, then applying the Common price to the full share count overstates the true blended market value, and every market-cap-derived multiple in this dive (EV/EBITDA, P/E, EV/Sales) is modestly overstated as a result. We cannot quantify the effect from this file and are not going to guess at it. Flag it, size the conclusion accordingly, and check the Class A price before acting on any multiple here.

6. Valuation — priced in or room?

At $360.44 (market cap ~$50.2B subject to the dual-class caveat, net debt $1.976B, EV ~$52.6B):

Other trailing marks: P/FCF 54.2x, P/OCF 50.4x, P/S 10.2x, EV/Sales 10.7x, P/B 10.5x, free cash flow yield 1.84%, earnings yield 1.57%.

Street position: consensus PT $376 (+4.3%), median $370, high $410 (+13.8%), low $350 (-2.9%, below spot). Ratings: 22 buy, 13 hold, 0 sell. So the Street is positive but a third of it is on the fence, and its most bearish member is already below the market price. FMP's own quantitative rating is B- with a P/E sub-score of 1 and a P/B sub-score of 1 — the quant screen is explicitly flagging valuation.

Synthos fair values:

• Bear ~$241 — 35x FY2027E consensus EPS ($6.89). Gets there on a multiple de-rate with nothing wrong at the company: a commercial-aviation cycle wobble, a soft print, or simple mean reversion as the consensus deceleration to 8% becomes the headline. -33.1%.
• Base ~$351 — 45x FY2028E consensus EPS ($7.80). Forty-five times is still a large premium for a business consensus models growing EPS ~13% into FY2028 (a PEG above 3), and it is defensible only because of the margin trajectory, 125% FCF conversion and the beat record. It lands almost exactly on the Street's low target of $350. -2.6%.
• Bull ~$449 — 50x FY2029E consensus EPS ($8.99). Requires the multiple to hold near today's level and the out-years to be beaten, as every quarter in this file has been. Above the Street high of $410. +24.6%.

Base sits 2.6% BELOW spot. That is the verdict in one number: on defensible arithmetic, the market has already paid for the next two years.

6a. What today's price assumes (the inversion)

At $360.44 (52.3x FY2027E, 46.2x FY2028E consensus), today's price assumes roughly:

• Revenue compounds to at least the consensus $6.309B by FY2028 — a 12.0% CAGR from FY2025's $4.485B — and HEICO keeps buying it, since consensus itself has revenue growth halving from 18.1% to 8.1% over the window. (Falsifiable: FY2026 and FY2027 revenue prints; and the acquisition line, which was $629.83M in FY2025.) Consensus-derived, 15 and 12 analysts.
• EPS reaches ~$7.80 by FY2028E and ~$8.99 by FY2029E — implying net income roughly $1.10B and $1.27B against FY2025's $690.38M, i.e. net income up 84% in four years. (Falsifiable: the FY2027 and FY2028 annual prints.) Consensus-derived, 12 and 5 analysts — note FY2029 rests on only 5.
• Operating margin holds at or above the ~24-25% the Q2 FY2026 run-rate implies, not the 22.7% FY2025 average — consensus FY2028E EBIT of $1.510B on $6.309B of revenue is a 23.9% EBIT margin, above every full year in the file. (Falsifiable: quarterly operating margin, and specifically the incremental margin. Q2 FY2026 printed 25.5% and 35.5% respectively.)
• The market keeps paying roughly 45-50x forward earnings for a business decelerating toward 8% revenue growth — i.e. essentially no de-rating for four consecutive years. (Falsifiable in the price itself. This is the assumption doing the most work.)
• The acquisition pipeline stays available at accretive prices. (Falsifiable: the cash-flow acquisitions line and whether goodwill, already 43.1% of assets, keeps growing without impairment.)

The single most fragile assumption is the last multiple bullet. Everything about the operating business supports the estimates; nothing supports a permanent 45-50x. A move to 35x FY2027E costs 33% and requires no operational disappointment whatsoever.

6b. The return bridge (why the multiple moves)

expected return ≈ EPS growth + multiple drift + shareholder yield

Over a two-year horizon to FY2028E, consensus EPS grows from $6.10 to $7.80 — 13.1% a year. The dividend yield is 0.069% and net buybacks are trivial ($22.39M against a $50B cap), so shareholder yield is effectively zero. That leaves multiple drift as the entire swing factor.

Our base case explicitly assumes multiple COMPRESSION, from today's 52.3x FY2027E to 45x FY2028E, and we want to be precise about why. Two reasons, and neither is a criticism of the company:

1. Growth maturation. Consensus has revenue growth halving from 18.1% (FY2026E) to 8.1% (FY2028E) and 7.9% (FY2029E). Multiples follow growth rates down. At 8% revenue growth and ~13% EPS growth, 52x is a PEG near 4.

2. The rolldown is not the re-rating. 59.1x FY2026E becoming 46.2x FY2028E at an unchanged $360.44 is mechanical — it is the estimate advancing, not the market repaying you. Our base compresses the multiple the market pays at each date, from ~52x to ~45x. That is the actual re-rating assumption and it is deliberate.

So the bridge to our $351 base is: +13.1% a year of EPS growth, minus roughly 14% of cumulative multiple compression, plus ~0% yield — netting to approximately zero over two years. If instead the multiple simply holds near 50x on FY2029E, you get the $449 bull. The thesis for buying here needs multiple expansion or persistence, and that is the fragile leg. Not the earnings.

6c. Variant perception (where we differ, what would surprise)

• We think consensus is too LOW on earnings and too GENEROUS on the multiple, and the second effect dominates. HEICO beat in all five reported quarters in the file, by an average that includes a 24.8% beat in Q2 FY2026, and the incremental operating margin of 35.5% says the beats are margin-driven, not one-off. So we would not be surprised to see FY2027E and FY2028E revised up. We still do not want to own it here, because a 45-50x multiple has more room to fall than the estimates have to rise. This is the crux of the variant perception: right on the business, unwilling to pay for it.
• Where we differ from the bulls specifically. Consensus PT of $376 implies 54.6x FY2027E — a multiple above today's. That is the Street underwriting no de-rating at all through the deceleration. We think that is the least defensible part of the consensus view, and notably the Street's own low target of $350 (50.8x FY2027E) agrees enough to sit below spot.
• Positive surprise that would force a repricing higher. The 2026-08-24 Q3 print beating the $1.50 consensus with incremental operating margin above 30% again, plus an FY2027 revenue guide above the $5.834B consensus. Two consecutive quarters of 30%-plus incremental margin would mean the FY2028E 23.9% EBIT margin is too low and the whole estimate stack moves up — at which point 52x FY2027E is really ~45x on revised numbers and our Watch is wrong.
• Negative surprise that would force a repricing lower. A revenue print in line or below consensus with the incremental margin reverting toward the 22.7% average, or a large acquisition at a full multiple that dilutes returns. Either one, at 52x with the stock 1.3% from its high and no drawdown cushion, opens the $241-$300 zone quickly. The watchable number is the incremental operating margin, reported quarterly.

7. Knowledge base — the panel underwrites the business, and pre-registered the price objection

9 tagged claims across 2 tracked sources. All bullish. Conviction 65-85. Breadth 2 — which is thinner than it looks, because 7 of the 9 come from a single Business Breakdowns episode dated 2024-03-31, now over two years old.

Business Breakdowns (2024-03-31, 7 claims, conviction 65-85):

• conviction 85: "HEICO is a well-managed cash-flow compounder acting as a low-cost second source (PMA) of aircraft parts with durable moats."
• conviction 85: "The Mendelson family, owner-operators since 1990, compounded sales 15%/net income 18%/returns 21% with an owned-forever, decentralized philosophy."
• conviction 75: "HEICO undercuts OEMs 30-40%, widening the discount over time by not raising price, which deepens cost savings and customer lock-in."
• conviction 75: "HEICO's prisoner's-dilemma strategy caps PMA share at ~30% and avoids life-limited parts, so OEMs stay rational and don't cut price."
• conviction 70: "HEICO outperforms in rough industry environments as airlines cut costs and face supply-chain crunches, driving PMA adoption on both price and availability."
• conviction 70 (fact-tagged): "Over 80M parts sold with zero service bulletins, airworthiness directives, or in-flight shutdowns — a quality record no OEM can match."
• conviction 65: "HEICO's electronics group (ETG) is like analog semis but less cyclical/less growth — diversified mission-critical components at 30%+ defense margins, non-cyclical."

We Study Billionaires (2 claims, conviction 65):

• 2025-10-23: "Mendelson family are true fanatics maximizing long-term free-cash-flow-per-share, which can make headline PE look unattractive today — a model management case study."
• 2025-11-27: "Heico's high customer lock-in in the aviation industry gives it strong pricing power and high customer retention."

How to read this lane — and the part that matters most. Every single claim underwrites the business. Not one names a price, a target, or a valuation. And the 2025-10-23 claim does something unusual and useful: it pre-registers our exact objection, noting that the family's focus on long-run free cash flow per share "can make headline PE look unattractive today." The tracked panel is telling you that HEICO will look expensive and that the answer is to hold through it.

That is a legitimate argument and we take it seriously — it is why the verdict is Hold for existing owners rather than Sell. But it is not an argument for paying 52x on a day when the stock is 1.3% from its high with no drawdown available. Conviction on the franchise does not transfer automatically to conviction on the entry.

Adjacent theme context, labelled as NOT naming HEICO: Brent Johnson (2025-09-21, conviction 75) — "Defense and aerospace is a huge beneficiary as nations rearm and boost national-defense spending in a less cooperative world." Business Breakdowns (2026-02-01, conviction 70) — "Jet engines require extraordinary technical performance at extraordinary low cost, creating barriers as hard as semiconductor fabrication; only 3-4 primes exist." Both support the sector; neither is a HEICO claim.

8. Technicals — the problem in one chart-line

• Price $360.44 (2026-08-03 close), against a 52-week range of $256.11-$369.48 (quote) / $260.99-$365.31 (tech block).
• -1.33% from the 52-week high. The max_dd_from_peak reading over the technical window is also -1.33% — meaning there has been no correction at all. There is nothing to buy into.
• 50-day average $340.65 — the stock is +5.8% above it, and the 50-DMA is above the 200-DMA at $318.17, which the stock clears by +13.3%. A textbook intact uptrend.
• RSI 61.2 — strong but not extended. MACD +4.91 — positive momentum.
• Relative performance: +34.3% (3-month) versus SPY +5.1% — a 29-point outperformance in a quarter, driven by the Q2 FY2026 beat. But +10.3% (12-month) versus SPY +19.9% — HEICO underperformed over the full year and has made it all back, and more, in three months.

Read: the 12-month picture is a stock that went nowhere and then re-rated violently on one quarter. Momentum is genuine, the trend is intact, and there is zero margin of safety in the entry. Support is the 50-DMA at $340.65 (-5.5%), then the 200-DMA at $318.17 (-11.7%).

Insider activity is unremarkable and does not read as a signal either way: Victor Mendelson gifted 3,285 shares (2026-06-29); the Chief Accounting Officer exercised and had shares withheld in kind around $259.81 (2026-05-29) and sold 1,326 at $241.63 (2026-06-10); a director gifted 140 shares. Small, routine, mostly non-open-market. No insider buying.

9. Verdict, kill-criteria and the flip conditions

Watch. Hold for existing owners; no new money at 52.3x FY2027E.

We have no argument with HEICO the business. It is a wide-moat, family-controlled, self-funding compounder with 39.8% gross margins, 125% free-cash-flow conversion, capex at 1.6% of revenue, a perfect five-for-five beat record in this dataset, a 35.5% incremental operating margin in the most recent quarter, and a knowledge-base lane that has underwritten it at conviction 65-85 since 2024. If you own it, keep owning it — the We Study Billionaires claim about the headline P/E looking unattractive is the right frame for a holder.

We have a serious argument with the entry. At $360.44 you are paying 52.3x FY2027E and 46.2x FY2028E consensus EPS, 38.4x TTM EV/EBITDA and 54.2x trailing free cash flow, for a company whose own consensus models revenue growth halving from 18.1% to 8.1% over that window. The stock is 1.3% below its all-time high after a 34.3% three-month run, with a maximum drawdown of -1.33% — there is no dip. The consensus PT of $376 offers 4.3%, the Street's low target of $350 is below the current price, and our base fair value of $351 is 2.6% below spot. Every honest anchor available lands at or under where the stock already trades.

Pre-registered kill / do-not-add criteria:

• Incremental operating margin reverts toward the 22.7% FY2025 average for two consecutive quarters — the Q2 FY2026 acceleration was a one-off and the estimate stack is not going up.
• A revenue print in line or below consensus ($1.348B for Q3 FY2026 on 2026-08-24) at this multiple.
• A large acquisition at a full multiple that pushes goodwill materially above the current 43.1% of assets without a clear margin case — the model depends on buying well, and the tangible book is already negative $3.73 per share.
• Any goodwill impairment. With $5.133B of goodwill and intangibles against $4.305B of equity, an impairment is a balance-sheet event, not a footnote.
• Loss of the 200-DMA ($318.17) on company-specific news rather than market beta — that would be the market pricing the deceleration, and the $241-$300 zone opens.

Pre-registered flip to Stage-In (start building a position):

• A 20%-plus drawdown toward the 200-DMA ($318.17) or below on no fundamental deterioration — that takes the FY2027E multiple to roughly 46x and the FY2028E to 41x, which is a price we would engage with for this franchise.
• OR two consecutive quarters of 30%-plus incremental operating margin plus an FY2027 revenue guide above the $5.834B consensus — that would mean consensus is materially too low, the effective multiple is lower than it looks, and paying up is justified on revised numbers.

Where HEI fits in the Synthos Framework Portfolio. The quality-compounder / aerospace-aftermarket sleeve, as a long-duration core hold once owned at a sensible basis — but not a name to initiate here. Positioning note: HEICO's counter-cyclical characteristic (airlines adopt PMA harder when they are cutting costs, per the 2024-03-31 claim at conviction 70) makes it a genuine diversifier against cyclical industrials, which is an argument for owning it eventually and not an argument for owning it today. Logged as a tracked Synthos call (Watch / Hold-for-owners) as of 2026-08-04 at $360.44.

Single biggest risk: multiple compression into a decelerating consensus. Not the balance sheet, not the moat, not management — the multiple. 52.3x FY2027E on a consensus that has revenue growth halving to 8.1% by FY2028E is the whole exposure, and a de-rate to 35x costs 33% with nothing whatsoever going wrong operationally.

Single most fragile assumption in the price: that the market keeps paying 45-50x forward earnings for four consecutive years while the growth rate halves. Every other assumption embedded at $360.44 is supported by something in the data. That one is supported only by the fact that it has been true recently.

Provenance and disclosures

• Traceability: 9 tagged knowledge-base claims name HEICO across 2 tracked sources (breadth 2, net conviction positive-moderate). Business Breakdowns, 7 claims all dated 2024-03-31, conviction 65-85, covering the compounder thesis, the Mendelson family record, the 30-40% PMA discount, the ~30% share cap, counter-cyclicality, the 80M-parts quality record and the ETG segment. We Study Billionaires, 2 claims (2025-10-23 conviction 65 on free-cash-flow-per-share fanaticism and the unattractive headline P/E; 2025-11-27 conviction 65 on customer lock-in). Every claim underwrites the business; none names a price or a target. The deep 7-claim block is over two years old, which is why conviction is rated Moderate rather than High. Adjacent aerospace/defense theme claims are cited in section 7 and explicitly labelled as not naming HEICO.
• Data as-of: prices and quote 2026-08-03 close (FMP quote timestamp 2026-08-03 20:00 UTC) · income statement through Q2 FY2026 (2026-04-30, filed 2026-05-29) · annual balance sheet and cash flow FY2025 (2025-10-31, filed 2025-12-22) · segment data FY2025 · analyst estimates, price targets, grades and earnings calendar last updated 2026-08-04 · knowledge-base search 2026-08-04.
• Fiscal-year note: HEICO's fiscal year ends 31 October. All "FY2026E" references are to the year ending 2026-10-31.
• Dual-class caveat — affects every multiple in this dive: HEICO has two listed share classes (Common HEI and Class A HEI.A). This dataset contains no HEI.A price. The reported market capitalisation of $50.216B at $360.44 implies 139.32M shares, close to the FY2025 weighted diluted count of 140.77M — i.e. it appears to apply the Common price across the full count. If Class A trades at a discount, the true blended market value is lower and every market-cap-derived multiple here (P/E on cap, EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales, P/B, P/FCF) is modestly overstated. We cannot quantify the effect from this file and have not estimated it.
• Data gaps stated plainly: the dataset does not disclose organic versus acquired revenue growth — section 4 says so explicitly rather than estimating it. seg_geo reports only two buckets and the labels changed between FY2023 and FY2024 ("Other Countries" to "Non-US"), so pre-FY2024 geographic comparisons are not exactly like-for-like. FY2029E consensus rests on only 5 EPS analysts and is treated as indicative, not load-bearing. the R&D line reports $0 from Q4 FY2025 onward (and for FY2025 as a whole) where prior periods reported $27-32M a quarter and $95-111M a year, which reads as a reporting or classification change rather than a genuine collapse in R&D spend — the dataset does not say which, so we have drawn no conclusion from the R&D line anywhere in this dive, and readers should note that the FY2025 gross margin of 39.8% versus FY2024's 41.8% may be affected by the same change.
• Fair-value method: scenario multiples applied to consensus EPS — bear 35x FY2027E ($6.886), base 45x FY2028E ($7.802), bull 50x FY2029E ($8.987). Stated arithmetic, not a discounted cash flow. The base deliberately assumes multiple compression from today's 52.3x, for the reasons given in section 6b.
• Half-weight management framing applied throughout — no company guidance is treated as fact.
• Not investment advice. Independent research, educational and informational only, never personalised.
• Version: 2026-08-04-full.