SYNTHOS RESEARCH

BYD Company BYDDY

Consumer Cyclical · Auto - Manufacturers · Synthos Deep Dive · 2026-08-04

$11.94
Avoid
—
—

The Overview

BYD is one of the largest carmakers in the world and probably the most important electric-vehicle company outside the United States. It makes its own batteries and its own chips, employs almost 870,000 people, and spends the equivalent of about $7.6 billion a year on research.

BYDDY is not shares in BYD. It is a receipt, traded in America, that represents shares held somewhere else — and it is an unsponsored receipt, which means BYD itself did not arrange it and takes no responsibility for it.

The consequence is the most important thing in this report. BYD files nothing with the US securities regulator. No annual report, no quarterly report, no audited accounts, nothing. For every other company in this research batch we read the company's own filings and found errors in the data we were given — a wrong debt figure here, a missing acquisition there. Here there is nothing to read. Everything below comes from one data provider, unchecked.

And that data provider's file has problems. It reports the company's borrowings as CNY 81 billion while separately listing short-term and long-term borrowings that add up to CNY 157 billion. It quotes the price in dollars and the accounts in Chinese yuan, using at least two different exchange rates in different places. It says this security is not a depositary receipt, which is wrong. And the one analyst who covers it has a price target of $42 against a market price of $11.94 — a number so far from the price that it is more likely to be a mistake than a forecast.

What the data does show is a business going backwards. Last year revenue stopped growing and profit margins collapsed — for every 100 yuan of sales the company kept 15 yuan of gross profit, down from 19. Operating profit fell 57%. In the first three months of 2026 it got worse: sales fell 12% and profit fell 55%.

Meanwhile it spent CNY 152 billion building factories while generating only CNY 58 billion of cash — so it burned about CNY 95 billion, and borrowings nearly tripled.

Interestingly, one of the independent commentators we track predicted exactly this in December 2025, describing Chinese national champions including BYD as "negative-margin factories" propped up by cheap savings. The accounts since have proved him right.

None of this proves BYD is a bad company. It may be a great one. It proves that we cannot tell, and that the instrument available to Americans to bet on it is illiquid, unverifiable and quoted in a currency the accounts are not.

Putting a number on it: our fair-value estimate is $10.40 against a current price of $11.94 — consistent with our call to stay away or wait for a better setup.

Our summary metrics

Downside Risk (lower = safer)9/10Very High

"Rated 9 — the highest downside risk in this batch, and the largest component of it is that the risk cannot be measured. FIRST AND OVERRIDING: there are NO SEC FILINGS. The filings index returns null for this ticker, which the data contract confirms is correct — BYDDY is one of four names in a 737-security universe that file nothing, being unsponsored depositary receipts on foreign issuers. There is no annual report, no interim report, no auditor's opinion, no related-party disclosure, no segment note and no management discussion available to this programme. Every number below comes from one vendor feed with no independent check, and no defect in it can be caught the way defects were caught on the other eleven names in this batch. SECOND, the operating deterioration is severe and recent: fiscal 2025 revenue FELL 0.6% to CNY 772,384.8 million, gross margin fell 440 basis points to 15.04%, operating income fell 56.7% and earnings per share fell 24.1%; the March 2026 quarter saw revenue fall 11.8%, operating income fall 34.8% and net income fall 55.4%. THIRD, the cash position: fiscal 2025 operating cash flow of CNY 57,875.2 million fell 56.6% while capital expenditure rose to CNY 152,535.6 million, producing free cash flow of MINUS CNY 94,660.5 million — roughly minus $12.4 billion — and total debt rose 168% from CNY 30,237.0 million to CNY 80,963.7 million. Working capital is NEGATIVE CNY 89,597.3 million and the current ratio is 0.815. FOURTH, the currency and structure: the security is quoted in USD, the financials report in CNY, the payload carries at least two different implied exchange rates, `profile.isAdr` is reported as FALSE for what is an American Depositary Receipt, and the conversion ratio cannot be verified from any available document. FIFTH, liquidity: 261,039 receipts traded, approximately $3.1 million of turnover — two orders of magnitude below the other names in this batch — on an OTC line whose last print was 8.5 minutes before the close. SIXTH, jurisdiction: a Chinese issuer with 869,622 employees, no US reporting obligation, and a knowledge-base lane arguing that its economics are a function of state-directed capital allocation."

Growth Quality4/10Moderate

"Rated 4 — a company whose growth has stopped and reversed, against a consensus that expects it to resume. The historical record is genuinely extraordinary: revenue of CNY 156,597.7 million (FY2020), 216,142.4, 424,060.6, 602,315.4, 777,102.5 (FY2024) — a 49.3% four-year compound rate — and then CNY 772,384.8 million in FY2025, a DECLINE of 0.6%. The profitability path is worse than the revenue path: gross margin went 19.38% (FY2020), 13.02%, 17.04%, 19.84%, 19.44% (FY2024) and then 15.04% in FY2025 — a 440-basis-point collapse — with operating income falling from CNY 50,486.0 million to CNY 21,873.8 million, a 56.7% decline, and earnings per share from CNY 4.61 to CNY 3.50. The March 2026 quarter continued it: revenue CNY 150,225.3 million against CNY 170,360.4 million, DOWN 11.8%; gross margin 18.81% against 20.07%; operating income down 34.8%; net income down 55.4%; earnings per share CNY 0.45 against CNY 1.04, down 56.7%. Research and development remains enormous at CNY 57,978.1 million, 7.51% of revenue and up 9.0% in a year revenue fell — which is either commitment or inflexibility. Consensus expects a sharp recovery: revenue of CNY 918,201.3 million in FY2026 (+18.9%, 14 analysts) and earnings per share of CNY 4.420 (+26.3%, THREE analysts), then CNY 1,040,031.3 million and CNY 5.655 in FY2027 (15 and 3 analysts). Nothing in the two most recent reported periods supports that recovery, and the estimate coverage on earnings is three analysts."

Exponential Potential6/10High

"Rated 6 — a genuinely formidable industrial position that this dive can describe and cannot verify. BYD is vertically integrated to a degree almost no other automaker attempts — batteries, semiconductors, electronics and vehicles under one roof, with 869,622 employees — and the knowledge base's independent lane is clear that the category is winning: 'Chinese EVs are cheaper, better-equipped and technologically ahead of Western models (ex-Tesla); passenger-car exports accelerating with no German components' (`andreas_steno`, 2023, bullish 60), and 'US blue chips are losing share to Chinese national champions in China and soon globally — the Caterpillar-displacement pattern repeating with better Chinese products' (`forward_guidance`, 2025, conviction 70). Research and development of CNY 57,978.1 million a year — 7.51% of revenue and larger in absolute terms than the entire revenue of several names in this batch — is a real commitment to that position. Against it stand two arguments from the same store, and they are the reason this is a 6 rather than an 8: 'Fears that Chinese cars end other automakers are overhyped; BYD/Chinese EVs are cool but feel cheap like Tesla/Hyundai — the real battle is chips, not cars', and the sharper economic point, 'China runs 'factory feudalism': peasant savings forced into 1% CDs subsidize negative-margin factories (e.g. BYD).' A company can hold a formidable technological and cost position and still be a poor investment if the returns are competed or directed away — and a 440-basis-point gross-margin collapse alongside CNY 94.7 billion of negative free cash flow is what that looks like in the accounts."

Fair value$10.4 $7.5–$16.9
What does “fair value” mean?

Fair value is Synthos’s estimate of what one share is worth today, based on our model of the company’s future cash generation and the risks to it. It is not a price target or a prediction of where the stock trades next quarter — it’s the price where we think risk and reward are balanced. Above it, you’re paying for outcomes better than our base case; below it, the market is offering a margin of safety.

The model’s inputs and weightings are proprietary — they’re the product. What we publish is the output, plus an independent, public-math cross-check further down the page (“Check our number”) so you can judge it for yourself.

What do the 5 tiers mean? (Core · Tactical · Watch · Hold · Avoid)
Buy — CoreOwn it as a foundation — start or add now, size it for years, let dips be gifts.
Buy — TacticalGood price + confirmed trend + a defined exit — buy the setup, not a marriage.
WatchWe want the business, just not at this price/setup — act only when the listed trigger hits.
HoldFine to keep if you own it — no reason to buy more; new money does better elsewhere.
AvoidDon't own it — the problem is the business or the expectations, so a cheaper price won't fix it.

The Road Ahead

What we expect to matter in each window, and the evidence that would prove us wrong.

Short term 0-6 months

No differentiated view
Driver
"An illiquid receipt on a deteriorating business, trading near-term overbought. BYDDY closed 2026-08-04 at $11.94, DOWN 0.91% from $12.05, on 261,039 receipts — approximately $3.1 million of turnover, two orders of magnitude below every other name in this batch — with a last print timestamped 19:51:31Z, roughly eight and a half minutes before the other names in this batch. The technical position is mixed and none of it is encouraging: 21.3% below the 52-week high of $15.15, 28.7% above the low of $9.27, 9.0% ABOVE a 50-day moving average of $10.96 but 2.7% BELOW a 200-day average of $12.27, with RSI at 69.95 — the highest in this batch and at the conventional overbought threshold — and MACD only marginally positive at +0.31. The maximum drawdown from peak over the trailing year was 39.5%. Returns: three months −8.9%, six months +3.2%, twelve months −16.3%, against SPY's +7.6%, +11.1% and +24.3% — a 41-point twelve-month deficit. Underneath, the March quarter showed revenue down 11.8% and net income down 55.4%. And the reporting date cannot be established: the earnings calendar carries two future dates twenty-five days apart with revenue estimates differing by 33%."
What we’re watching
"The next reported result, whenever it arrives — the file gives 2026-08-04 and 2026-08-29 as competing dates with estimates of $0.11 and $0.1013 per receipt on revenue of $36,282M and $27,318M respectively, and both cannot be right. Within whatever is reported: gross margin against the March quarter's 18.81% and fiscal 2025's 15.04%; revenue against the March quarter's CNY 150,225.3 million, which was down 11.8% year on year; and any indication of the capital-expenditure run rate, which reached CNY 152,535.6 million in fiscal 2025 against operating cash flow of CNY 57,875.2 million. Because there are no filings, none of this can be independently confirmed and all of it will arrive through the same vendor feed that produced the internal contradictions catalogued in Section 4."
Confidence
Low

Medium term 6-24 months

Neutral
Driver
"Over two years the question is whether fiscal 2025 and the March quarter were a price war that ends or a structural reset in the economics of Chinese electric vehicles. The consensus assumes the former: revenue recovering 18.9% in FY2026 to CNY 918,201.3 million and earnings per share rising 26.3% to CNY 4.420, then 13.3% and 27.9% in FY2027. On those numbers, and assuming one receipt equals one ordinary share, the security trades at 20.6 times FY2026 and 16.1 times FY2027 earnings, 10.3 times trailing EV/EBITDA and 1.21 times trailing EV/sales — not expensive for a company that compounded revenue at 49% a year through 2024. The knowledge base assumes the latter: 'peasant savings forced into 1% CDs subsidize negative-margin factories (e.g. BYD)', a claim made in December 2025 and confirmed by a 440-basis-point gross-margin collapse, CNY 94.7 billion of negative free cash flow and a 168% increase in total debt. This dive cannot adjudicate between them, because it has no filings, no segment disclosure, no volume data, no pricing data and no management commentary — `seg_prod` and `seg_geo` are both EMPTY and the insider block is EMPTY. What it can say is that the earnings estimates rest on THREE analysts, that the single published price target of $42 is 252% above the market price and identical across its high, low, mean and median fields, and that neither figure can be relied on."
What we’re watching
"Whether gross margin recovers from 15.04% — the single most informative number available. Whether revenue returns to growth after a 0.6% annual decline and an 11.8% quarterly decline. Whether capital expenditure moderates from CNY 152,535.6 million, which is 19.8% of revenue and 2.6 times operating cash flow. Whether total debt stabilises after rising 168% in a year to CNY 80,963.7 million against negative working capital of CNY 89,597.3 million. Whether the earnings estimate coverage rises above three analysts. And whether BYD ever becomes a sponsored, SEC-reporting issuer — which is the single change that would allow this security to be analysed on the same basis as everything else in this programme."
Confidence
Low

Long term 2+ years

Neutral
Driver
"Long-run the industrial case for BYD is strong and the case for this SECURITY is separate from it. The company is vertically integrated across batteries, semiconductors, electronics and vehicles, employs 869,622 people, and spends CNY 57,978.1 million a year on research and development — more in absolute terms than the entire revenue of several companies in this batch. The independent knowledge-base lane supports the category without reservation: Chinese electric vehicles are 'cheaper, better-equipped and technologically ahead of Western models (ex-Tesla)', and 'US blue chips are losing share to Chinese national champions in China and soon globally.' If that is right, BYD is one of the most important industrial companies in the world. But three structural facts sit between that observation and this receipt. The first is the economics: the same store's sharpest claim is that Chinese national champions are run as subsidised negative-margin factories, and the fiscal 2025 accounts — margin down 440 basis points, free cash flow minus CNY 94.7 billion, debt up 168% — are consistent with it. The second is the counter-argument that 'the real battle is chips, not cars', which if correct locates the durable profit pool somewhere other than the vehicle assembler. The third is structural and permanent: an unsponsored depositary receipt with no SEC reporting, no sponsor bank relationship disclosed here, roughly $3 million of daily turnover and an unverifiable conversion ratio is a poor instrument for expressing any long-run view, however correct."
What we’re watching
"Whether BYD sponsors its depositary programme or lists in a jurisdiction with enforceable disclosure. Whether gross margin returns above 19%, the level of fiscal 2023 and 2024. Whether the export mix grows — the knowledge base notes 'passenger-car exports accelerating with no German components' and 'India becomes a growth market for cheap high-quality Chinese goods like Xiaomi phones and BYD cars', against a separate claim that India is 'rejecting Chinese EV investment (BYD) to court Tesla', and none of it is in the data. Whether tariffs and trade policy alter the export path; one claim explicitly argues state subsidy 'justifies aggressive tariffs'. Whether the capital-expenditure cycle of CNY 152.5 billion a year produces returns or capacity nobody needs. And whether the vertical-integration advantage in batteries and semiconductors — the strongest part of the industrial case — is ever visible in a segment disclosure, since `seg_prod` in this payload is empty."
Confidence
Low

Exponential Potential

Exponential Potential6/10High

"Rated 6 — a genuinely formidable industrial position that this dive can describe and cannot verify. BYD is vertically integrated to a degree almost no other automaker attempts — batteries, semiconductors, electronics and vehicles under one roof, with 869,622 employees — and the knowledge base's independent lane is clear that the category is winning: 'Chinese EVs are cheaper, better-equipped and technologically ahead of Western models (ex-Tesla); passenger-car exports accelerating with no German components' (`andreas_steno`, 2023, bullish 60), and 'US blue chips are losing share to Chinese national champions in China and soon globally — the Caterpillar-displacement pattern repeating with better Chinese products' (`forward_guidance`, 2025, conviction 70). Research and development of CNY 57,978.1 million a year — 7.51% of revenue and larger in absolute terms than the entire revenue of several names in this batch — is a real commitment to that position. Against it stand two arguments from the same store, and they are the reason this is a 6 rather than an 8: 'Fears that Chinese cars end other automakers are overhyped; BYD/Chinese EVs are cool but feel cheap like Tesla/Hyundai — the real battle is chips, not cars', and the sharper economic point, 'China runs 'factory feudalism': peasant savings forced into 1% CDs subsidize negative-margin factories (e.g. BYD).' A company can hold a formidable technological and cost position and still be a poor investment if the returns are competed or directed away — and a 440-basis-point gross-margin collapse alongside CNY 94.7 billion of negative free cash flow is what that looks like in the accounts."

What could take this further than the base case — and where the market may be underpricing it. Full forward-growth and acceleration math in Deeper analysis, §4 below.

Deeper analysis

Technicals, fundamentals, valuation, and the full expert-claim evidence panel — the detail behind the numbers above.

Check our number Market-implied growth ≈ 7%/yr This isn’t how we calculate fair value — it’s public math you can verify yourself. To justify today’s $12, earnings would have to compound roughly 7% a year for 10 years (9% discount rate). Analysts forecast ~1%/yr, so the market is pricing in MORE than what the Street expects.

> ## ⚠ NO SEC FILINGS EXIST FOR THIS SECURITY

> BYDDY is an unsponsored American Depositary Receipt on a foreign private issuer that does not file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The programme's filings index returns null for this ticker. There is no 10-K, no 10-Q, no 8-K, no proxy statement and no auditor's report available to this dive. Every figure below comes from a single vendor data feed with no independent document against which to check it — and that feed contains the internal contradictions catalogued in Section 4. Confidence is lowered throughout and stated at every use. This is the only name in this batch that cannot be verified against a filing.

Reference table

THE CURRENCY CHECKprofile.currency = USD; inc_a[0].reportedCurrency = CNY. km_ttm.marketCap = ¥828,085,845,719 against quote.marketCap = $108,473,340,624 → implied 7.634 CNY/USD. The ratios_ttm block implies roughly 7.5. Two different rates in one payload
THE ADR RATIOUnverifiable. The payload's own arithmetic (¥828.09bn ÷ 9,117.3M ordinary shares = ¥90.83 = $11.90 at 7.634, against a quoted $11.94) implies one receipt = one ordinary share. If the true ratio differs, EVERY per-share multiple in this dive is wrong by that factor, and no document exists to check it
"Street consensus"$42 — and targetHigh, targetLow, targetConsensus and targetMedian are ALL $42, from ONE analyst (1 buy, 0 hold, 0 sell). 252% above the market price and inconsistent with every multiple in the file. Excluded
Valuation (CNY basis; USD conversion at 7.634)30.1x trailing · 20.6x FY2026E · 16.1x FY2027E · 10.3x EV/EBITDA · 1.21x EV/sales · 3.33x book · −10.7% free-cash-flow yield
FY2025 (CNY)Revenue ¥772,384.8M — DOWN 0.6% · gross margin 15.04% vs 19.44% (−440 bps) · operating income ¥21,873.8M, −56.7% · net income ¥31,730.3M, −21.2% · EPS ¥3.50, −24.1% · R&D ¥57,978.1M (7.51% of revenue)
March 2026 quarter (CNY)Revenue ¥150,225.3M — DOWN 11.8% · gross margin 18.81% vs 20.07% · operating income ¥7,183.6M, −34.8% · net income ¥4,084.6M, −55.4% · EPS ¥0.45 vs ¥1.04, −56.7%
Cash and debt (CNY)FY2025 operating cash flow ¥57,875.2M, −56.6% · capex ¥152,535.6M (19.8% of revenue, 2.6x OCF) · FREE CASH FLOW −¥94,660.5M · total debt ¥30,237.0M → ¥80,963.7M, +168% · working capital −¥89,597.3M · current ratio 0.815
ConvictionNegative-low, and the KB is more useful than the data. 9 entity claims; the sharpest is BEARISH and has been confirmed: "peasant savings... subsidize negative-margin factories (e.g. BYD)" (Dec 2025) — followed by a 440bp margin collapse
Technicals−21.3% from the 52-week high of $15.15, +28.7% above the low of $9.27; +9.0% above the 50-DMA but 2.7% BELOW the 200-DMA; RSI 69.95 — highest in this batch; MACD +0.31; max drawdown −39.5%; 12-month −16.3% vs SPY +24.3%

What the experts actually said

No independent expert claims in the Synthos knowledge base yet for BYDDY — this dive is fundamentals- and technicals-driven, not panel-driven.

Price & moving averages 12 months · 50 & 200-day averages · 52-week range

911131517Aug '25Oct '25Dec '25Mar '26May '26Aug '2652w hi $15200-DMA 12Price 1250-DMA 1152w lo $9

Solid line = price · dashed line = 50-day average · dotted line = 200-day average · the two thin horizontal lines mark the 52-week high and low. Price above both averages is an uptrend.

Data summary: last close $11.81, 8% above the 50-day average ($11), 4% below the 200-day average ($12) — a mixed trend. 22% below the 52-week high of $15, 27% above the 52-week low of $9.

Bollinger Bands 20-day average ± 2 standard deviations

811131618Aug '25Oct '25Dec '25Mar '26May '26Aug '26Price 1220-day avg 11

The shaded band widens when the stock gets more volatile. Riding the upper edge = strong momentum (sometimes stretched); the lower edge = weak / potentially oversold.

Data summary: price $11.81 is currently inside the band (band $10–$12).

RSI (14) momentum gauge · 0–100

705030Aug '25Oct '25Dec '25Mar '26May '26Aug '26RSI 61.2

Above 70 (overbought zone, shaded) = overbought, below 30 (oversold zone, shaded) = oversold. Currently 61.

MACD 12 / 26 / 9 · trend & momentum

0Aug '25Oct '25Dec '25Mar '26May '26Aug '26MACD 0.3signal 0.2

The MACD line crossing above the signal line (bars flip to the up color) = momentum turning up; crossing below (bars flip to the down color) = turning down. Bar height = the size of that gap.

Data summary: MACD is currently above its signal line by 0.08, positive momentum.

Relative performance vs S&P 500 & its sector (XLY (sector)), set to 100 a year ago

617794110127Aug '25Oct '25Dec '25Mar '26May '26Aug '26S&P 500 122XLY (sector) 108BYDDY 84

Solid = BYDDY · dashed = S&P 500 · dotted = XLY (sector). A rising line means it is beating that benchmark — the sector line shows whether it is a leader or laggard within its own group.

Forward revenue & earnings actual → estimate · "FY" = fiscal year, "E" = estimate

03276539801,306$609BFY23EPS $3$769BFY24EPS $5$839BFY25EPS $4$918BFY26EEPS $4$1,040BFY27EEPS $6$1,156BFY28EEPS $7$1,108BFY29EEPS $4$1,130BFY30EEPS $4

Darker bars = actual results, brighter = analyst estimates. Taller bars to the right = expected growth.

Key stats an RIA wants

Price$11.94
Market cap$108B
P/E trailingn/m (CNY-reported vs USD quote; see caveats)
P/E FY26E / FY27En/m (CNY-reported vs USD quote; see caveats) / n/m (CNY-reported vs USD quote; see caveats)
EV / Salesn/a — vendor EV unreliable
EV / EBITDAn/a — vendor EV unreliable
Gross margin16.9%
Net margin3.5%
Dividend yield0.44%
Beta0.335
52-wk range$9 – $15
RSI(14)70
50 / 200-DMA$11 / $12
12-mo return+-16% (SPY +24%)
Street target$42 ($42–$42)
Analyst grades1 Buy · 0 Hold · 0 Sell
FMP ratingB+
Next earnings'UNRESOLVABLE FROM THIS FILE. The `earn_cal` block contains TWO future reporting dates twenty-five days apart with materially different estimates: 2026-08-04 (the date of this dive) with estimated EPS $0.11 and revenue $36,282M, and 2026-08-29 with estimated EPS $0.1013 and revenue $27,318M. Both cannot be right, there are no filings against which to check, and the interval to either is short — which is itself an input to the verdict.'

EV multiples are withheld for this name: the vendor’s enterprise value differs from our own rebuild (market cap + total debt − cash − short-term investments) by more than 15%, so we do not know which is right. Rather than print a figure we cannot stand behind, we show none — the discussion in the body uses the corrected basis and says so.

1. The filings problem, and what it costs

The data contract for this programme states it directly: coverage is 733 of 737 names in the ETF universe, and "the four without are BYDDY, KMTUY, THLLY (unsponsored ADRs of foreign issuers that do not file with the SEC) and PRNT (an ETF)." The filings index returns null for this ticker. There is no archive directory.

Why that matters more than it sounds. Across the eleven other dives in this batch, the filing caught the vendor in an error every single time:

NameWhat the filing caught
ADPA capital-expenditure definition that changed mid-series; $46bn of client funds classified as non-current
BNYA 101% revenue gross-up; a $125bn contradiction between two fields
SOA trailing capex figure 44% below the filing's, inverting the sign of free cash flow
GDA 22% lease-inflated debt figure; an 85% geography double-count
PWRFour unrecorded acquisitions; a consensus below the company's own guidance
VRTA corrupt quarterly record; a net-debt figure that was actually net cash
TTA debt definition that changed between adjacent years
EQIXAn entire missing metric class — no FFO/AFFO for a REIT
NEMA quarterly revenue figure 43.5% too low; a geography block naming the UK as the largest market
DDOGA $4.07bn short-term-investment omission inverting net debt to net cash
PNCA 35.7% revenue gross-up; a mid-series basis change

On BYDDY none of that is possible. The payload's internal contradictions, catalogued in Section 4, are visible — but they cannot be resolved, only reported. That is the single largest reason this dive carries a Low confidence rating on every horizon and an Avoid verdict.

2. The currency and the conversion ratio

Two checks the brief specifically directed, and both find problems.

Check one — the reporting currency. profile.currency is USD. inc_a[0].reportedCurrency is CNY, as is every row of inc_q, bal_a and cf_a. Confirmed mismatch: the security is quoted in dollars and the financial statements report in renminbi.

Check two — the implied exchange rate, and there is more than one.

SourceCalculationImplied CNY/USD
km_ttm.marketCap ÷ quote.marketCap¥828,085,845,719 ÷ $108,473,340,6247.634
ratios_ttm.priceToEarningsRatioTTM ÷ trailing EPS30.0825 × ¥2.98 = ¥89.65, ÷ $11.94≈7.51
ratios_ttm.priceToBookRatioTTM × book value per share3.325 × ¥24.97 = ¥83.04, ÷ $11.94≈6.96

The market-capitalisation comparison is the cleanest — it is the same quantity expressed in two blocks of the same file — and it gives 7.634. The ratio-derived figures differ by 1.6% and 8.8% respectively, and part of that is probably different balance-sheet and earnings dates rather than pure FX inconsistency. But the file does not disclose which rate it uses anywhere, and this is precisely the defect class the brief flagged: a payload carrying multiple implied rates for one issuer. Every USD figure in this dive is converted at 7.634 and labelled.

Check three — the ADR conversion ratio, which cannot be resolved.

The payload's own arithmetic implies ONE receipt equals ONE ordinary share:

> km_ttm.marketCap of ¥828,085,845,719 ÷ the March-quarter diluted share count of 9,117,301,000 = ¥90.83 per ordinary share.

> At 7.634 CNY/USD that is $11.90.

> The quoted receipt price is $11.94 — a 0.3% difference.

So the vendor is treating the receipt as one-for-one with an ordinary share. We have no document that confirms or refutes it — an unsponsored depositary programme's ratio is set in a deposit agreement between a depositary bank and nobody in particular, and BYD publishes nothing to the SEC.

The consequence, stated plainly: if the true ratio is not 1:1, every per-share and per-receipt multiple in this dive is wrong by exactly that factor. A 2:1 ratio would halve the implied earnings per receipt and double every multiple; a 1:2 ratio would do the reverse. This is not a small caveat and it is not resolvable from the evidence available.

One piece of circumstantial evidence points at a problem. The single analyst covering this security carries a price target of $42 — with targetHigh, targetLow, targetConsensus and targetMedian all identical at $42. That is 252% above the market price and is inconsistent with every multiple in the file: at $42 the security would trade at 76 times FY2026 consensus earnings, for a company whose earnings fell 24% last year. Either the target is mis-mapped from a different listing — BYD's ordinary shares trade in Shenzhen in CNY and its H-shares in Hong Kong in HKD — or the conversion ratio embedded in the price feed differs from the one embedded in the target. Either way it is unusable and it is excluded from every calculation here.

3. What the numbers show

All figures in CNY as reported.

FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Revenue (¥M)216,142.4424,060.6602,315.4777,102.5772,384.8
Growth—+96.2%+42.0%+29.0%−0.6%
Gross profit (¥M)28,144.772,245.0119,512.2151,055.8116,191.6
Gross margin13.02%17.04%19.84%19.44%15.04%
Operating income (¥M)4,632.021,541.838,103.150,486.021,873.8
Operating margin2.14%5.08%6.33%6.50%2.83%
Net income (¥M)3,045.216,622.430,040.840,254.331,730.3
EPS (¥)0.351.903.444.613.50
Research and development (¥M)7,991.018,654.539,574.953,194.757,978.1
R&D % of revenue3.70%4.40%6.57%6.85%7.51%

And the quarterly series, which is worse than the annual one:

Q1 2025Q2 2025Q3 2025Q4 2025Q1 2026
Revenue (¥M)170,360.4200,920.5193,965.0234,418.7150,225.3
vs prior year———−14.7%−11.8%
Gross margin20.07%16.27%17.62%16.01%18.81%
Operating income (¥M)11,020.67,698.95,697.09,507.87,183.6
Net income (¥M)9,155.06,355.57,782.09,157.74,084.6
EPS (¥)1.040.700.850.980.45

Four observations.

Revenue growth did not slow; it stopped and reversed. From +96.2%, +42.0% and +29.0% to −0.6% in fiscal 2025 and −11.8% in the March 2026 quarter. The fourth quarter of 2025 was already down 14.7% on the fourth quarter of 2024.

The margin collapse is larger than the revenue decline and it is where the damage is. Gross margin fell 440 basis points in a single year and operating margin more than halved, from 6.50% to 2.83%. A 440-basis-point gross-margin loss on CNY 772 billion of revenue is roughly CNY 34 billion of gross profit — more than the entire year's net income.

Research and development rose 9.0% in a year revenue fell. CNY 57,978.1 million, 7.51% of revenue and rising in every year of the series. That is either an admirable refusal to cut the future to protect the quarter, or an inflexible cost base in a price war. Without management commentary — of which there is none — this dive cannot tell which.

The March quarter's gross margin of 18.81% is BETTER than the fiscal-2025 average of 15.04%, which is the one encouraging data point in the file and which sits alongside a 55.4% decline in net income. We report both and draw no conclusion from a single quarter.

The cash statement, which is the most alarming part

(¥M)FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Operating cash flow140,837.7169,725.0133,453.957,875.2
change—+20.5%−21.4%−56.6%
Capital expenditure(97,456.9)(122,093.5)(97,359.8)(152,535.6)
capex % of revenue23.0%20.3%12.5%19.8%
Free cash flow43,380.847,631.536,094.1−94,660.5
Depreciation and amortisation20,285.943,282.665,079.00 ← field missing

Operating cash flow fell 56.6% while capital expenditure rose 56.7%. The result is free cash flow of MINUS CNY 94,660.5 million — approximately minus $12.4 billion at 7.634 — against positive figures in each of the three prior years. Capital expenditure of CNY 152,535.6 million is 2.6 times operating cash flow.

And the balance sheet moved accordingly:

(¥M)FY2023FY2024FY2025
Cash and equivalents109,094.4102,738.775,472.8
Short-term investments9,562.640,511.563,752.7
totalDebt39,145.530,237.080,963.7
change—−22.8%+167.8%
netDebt (vendor)−69,948.9−72,501.75,490.9
Total equity138,810.1185,251.1227,685.5
Total liabilities529,085.6584,667.6650,534.5
Inventory87,676.7116,036.2138,508.7
Working capital (vendor TTM)——−89,597.3

Total debt rose 168% in twelve months. Cash fell CNY 27.3 billion while short-term investments rose CNY 23.2 billion, so gross liquidity was roughly flat at CNY 139.2 billion — but it is now financed with CNY 81.0 billion of debt rather than CNY 30.2 billion. Inventory rose 19.4% in a year revenue fell 0.6%. The current ratio is 0.815 and working capital is negative CNY 89.6 billion.

Note also that netDebt of CNY 5,490.9 million is computed as total debt less cash only, omitting the CNY 63,752.7 million of short-term investments — the same defect found on Datadog in this batch. On the correct basis the company is net CASH of approximately CNY 58,261.8 million. Both figures are recorded; the direction of travel is the point.

4. Data integrity — what we found, and what we could not resolve

Nine findings. On every other name in this batch these would be checked against a filing. Here they cannot be.

1. totalDebt is 94% BELOW the sum of its own components. bal_a at 2025-12-31 reports shortTermDebt of ¥72,337,737,000 and longTermDebt of ¥84,491,232,000, which sum to ¥156,828,969,000 — against a stated totalDebt of ¥80,963,713,000. The components exceed the total by 93.7%. The same block for FY2024 shows short-term ¥12,103,272,000 plus long-term ¥8,257,786,000 = ¥20,361,058,000 against a totalDebt of ¥30,237,025,000 — this time the total EXCEEDS the components by 48.5%. The block is internally inconsistent in both directions in adjacent years and no filing exists to adjudicate. This dive uses the stated totalDebt figures because netDebt reconciles to them, and flags the whole block as unreliable.

2. The payload carries at least two different implied CNY/USD exchange rates — 7.634 from the market-capitalisation fields and approximately 7.51 from the price-to-earnings ratio — and discloses none of them. (Section 2.)

3. profile.isAdr reads FALSE for an American Depositary Receipt. The ticker is BYDDY, the exchange is OTC, the issuer is a Chinese company reporting in CNY with 869,622 employees, and the security is manifestly a depositary receipt. The flag is wrong, and any screen using it to identify or exclude ADRs will mis-classify this name. (A CIK of 0001445162 is present in the profile, which is inconsistent with a non-filing issuer and is recorded without explanation.)

4. The ADR conversion ratio is unverifiable and the payload's arithmetic implies 1:1. (Section 2. Every per-share multiple here is conditional on it.)

5. pt carries IDENTICAL high, low, consensus and median values of $42, from ONE analyst. grades shows 1 buy, 0 hold, 0 sell. A "consensus" of one, with zero dispersion by construction, 252% above the market price, implying 76 times FY2026 consensus earnings for a company whose earnings fell 24% last year. Excluded from every calculation.

6. earn_cal contains TWO future reporting dates twenty-five days apart with materially different estimates — 2026-08-04 (estimated EPS $0.11, revenue $36,282M) and 2026-08-29 (estimated EPS $0.1013, revenue $27,318M), a 33% difference in the revenue estimate. Both cannot be right and there is no filing calendar to check. The next reporting date is therefore unknown, which is stated in the front matter rather than guessed.

7. cf_a reports depreciation and amortisation of ZERO for FY2025, against ¥65,079,049,000 in FY2024 and ¥43,282,572,000 in FY2023. A company with ¥152.5 billion of annual capital expenditure does not have zero depreciation. The field is missing, and km_ttm.capexToDepreciationTTM of 2.314 is therefore computed on a trailing basis this dive cannot reproduce.

8. seg_prod, seg_geo and insider are ALL EMPTY. No product split, no geographic split, no insider transactions. For a vertically integrated manufacturer of vehicles, batteries and semiconductors, the absence of any segment disclosure removes the single most useful analytical dimension — there is no way to see whether the margin collapse is in vehicles, in batteries or in electronics.

9. est shows revenue DECLINING between FY2028 and FY2029 and earnings per share collapsing 43% — EXCLUDED. revenueAvg runs ¥1,155,845.9M (FY2028), ¥1,108,105.4M (FY2029), ¥1,129,835.0M (FY2030), while epsAvg runs ¥6.730 → ¥3.833 → ¥3.711 on ONE analyst in each of those three years. A 43% earnings collapse on a 4% revenue decline, from a single estimate, is not a forecast. FY2028 through FY2030 are excluded entirely. Separately, est.ebitdaAvg is exactly 12.783% of revenueAvg and ebitAvg exactly 5.370% in every forward year — the fixed-ratio fabrication signature — and both are rejected.

What can be said in the payload's favour, and it is little:

Vendor composite rating — rejected outright. B+ / 4 overall with 5/5 on discounted cash flow. A 5-out-of-5 discounted-cash-flow score for a company that generated MINUS CNY 94.7 billion of free cash flow in its most recent fiscal year is not a judgement; it is an arithmetic failure, and it is the clearest single demonstration that this file should not be used unsupervised.

Non-equity tripwire — checked, and this one is the closest to a trip in the batch. BYDDY is an unsponsored American Depositary Receipt quoted OTC, not an exchange-listed common share. Beta is 0.335 — low, and for an OTC ADR that reflects thin trading rather than low fundamental volatility. Volume was 261,039 receipts, approximately $3.1 million of turnover — two orders of magnitude below every other name in this batch — and the last print was timestamped 19:51:31Z, roughly eight and a half minutes before the 20:00 prints on the other eleven names, which is what an illiquid line looks like at the close. The 52-week band of $9.27 to $15.15 is a 63% range. This is equity exposure, but it is exposure through an unsponsored receipt on a non-reporting issuer, and the instrument itself is part of the risk.

5. Valuation — and every figure is conditional

At $11.94, converting at 7.634 CNY/USD and assuming one receipt equals one ordinary share — both assumptions unverifiable:

TrailingFY2026EFY2027E
EPS (CNY)¥2.98 (sum of four quarters)¥4.420 (3 analysts)¥5.655 (3)
EPS (USD, at 7.634)$0.390$0.579$0.741
EPS growth−24.1% (FY2025 actual)+26.3%+27.9%
P/E30.6x (vendor: 30.08x)20.6x16.1x
Revenue (CNY M)772,384.8 (FY2025)918,201.3 (14)1,040,031.3 (15)
Revenue growth−0.6%+18.9%+13.3%
EV / sales1.21x——
EV / EBITDA10.26x——
Price / book3.33x——
Free cash flow yield−10.66%——
Return on equity11.86%——
Return on invested capital4.80%——

The estimate coverage is the thinnest in this batch: THREE analysts on FY2026 and FY2027 earnings per share. Revenue coverage is better at 14 and 15, which is the normal asymmetry for a company where unit volumes are widely tracked and margins are not. FY2028 through FY2030 rest on ONE analyst each and are excluded.

The central tension in one sentence: consensus expects earnings per share to rise 26.3% in fiscal 2026 after falling 24.1% in fiscal 2025 and 56.7% in the March quarter, on three analysts' estimates, at a company with no reporting obligation.

5a. What today's price assumes (the inversion)

At $11.94 — 20.6x FY2026 consensus, 16.1x FY2027, 1.21x EV/sales, 3.33x book — the price embeds:

5b. The return bridge (why the multiple moves)

Expected return over the next twelve months decomposes as: consensus EPS growth (+27.9%, from FY2026E ¥4.420 to FY2027E ¥5.655) + multiple drift (COMPRESSION of roughly 32%, from today's 20.6x on the current year toward about 14x) + shareholder yield (none disclosed in this payload) ≈ −13%.

Our base assumes substantial multiple compression and the reason is the evidence base rather than the forecast. A 20.6x multiple on a three-analyst estimate for a non-reporting issuer whose margins collapsed 440 basis points and whose free cash flow was minus CNY 94.7 billion is not a multiple we are willing to underwrite. A 14x multiple on the FY2027 consensus is what a cyclical vehicle manufacturer in a price war, with no verifiable accounts, plausibly deserves.

If the FY2027 consensus were met and the multiple held at 20.6x, the receipt would be $15.27 (+27.9%). If the earnings recovery does not arrive and the multiple compresses to 11x trailing, it is roughly $7.50.

5c. Variant perception (where we differ, what would surprise)

Synthos fair values

All three anchors are multiples of the FY2027 consensus earnings per share distribution (mean ¥5.655, low ¥5.002, high ¥6.452, THREE analysts), converted at 7.634 CNY/USD and assuming one receipt equals one ordinary share. Both conversions are unverifiable and the range below is deliberately wide because of it.

Base is 12.9% BELOW spot; the range spans −37.2% to +41.5%. A negative base case, an unverifiable conversion, no filings, three earnings analysts and $3.1 million of daily turnover is an Avoid, and the conditions under which it would change are named in Section 7.

6. Knowledge base — nine entity claims, and the bearish one has been confirmed

Raw hits: 45 across 19 channels. Claims naming BYD as an entity: 9. Discarded: 36.

Unusually for this batch, the knowledge base has more to say about this company than the financial data does — and on this name it has been right.

The claim that matters most, and it is bearish:

> 2025-12-19 · BEARISH · conviction 70 · horizon: principle · entity: BYD · channel: forward_guidance · skill 1.0

> "China runs 'factory feudalism': peasant savings forced into 1% CDs subsidize negative-margin factories (e.g. BYD), suppressing domestic consumption — same net result as US asset feudalism."

GRADED — CONFIRMED. Made 2025-12-19. The fiscal 2025 accounts show gross margin falling 440 basis points to 15.04%, operating margin falling from 6.50% to 2.83%, free cash flow of MINUS CNY 94,660.5 million and total debt rising 168%. The March 2026 quarter then showed revenue down 11.8% and net income down 55.4%. A claim that a specifically named company is being operated as a subsidised negative-margin factory, followed within eight months by exactly that pattern appearing in its accounts, is the single most valuable contribution the knowledge base makes anywhere in this batch.

The supporting bear claim:

> 2025-08-09 · bearish · conviction 68 · entities: China, BYD, Luckin Coffee, Starbucks · channel: all_in

> "China wields state-sponsored corporatism — subsidizing BYD, Luckin — to undercut US brands; justifies aggressive tariffs, but only after boxing China out via free-trade networks."

The bullish case, which is real and is about the category rather than the economics:

> 2025-05-14 · conviction 70 · entities: Caterpillar, Tesla, Apple, BYD, Huawei · channel: forward_guidance

> "US blue chips are losing share to Chinese national champions in China and soon globally — the Caterpillar-displacement pattern repeating with better Chinese products."

> 2023-08-21 · bullish · conviction 60 · entities: China EVs, Tesla · channel: andreas_steno · skill 0.8 (appears twice as near-duplicates and is counted once)

> "Chinese EVs are cheaper, better-equipped and technologically ahead of Western models (ex-Tesla); passenger-car exports accelerating with no German components."

> 2025-06-02 · bullish · conviction 50 · entities: Xiaomi, BYD · channel: geopolitical_cousins

> "India-China complementarity: China outsources cheap manufacturing to India while India becomes a growth market for cheap high-quality Chinese goods like Xiaomi phones and BYD cars."

The moderating view, from one channel and stated twice:

> 2025-05-06 and 2025-07-01 · neutral · conviction 55 · entities: China, BYD, Tesla · channel: geopolitical_cousins

> "Fears that Chinese cars end other automakers are overhyped; BYD/Chinese EVs are cool but feel cheap like Tesla/Hyundai — the real battle is chips, not cars."

And one that is bullish on India while being negative for BYD:

> 2025-07-01 · bullish · conviction 65 · entities: India, Tesla, BYD · channel: geopolitical_cousins

> "India is 'open for business' — rejecting Chinese EV investment (BYD) to court Tesla and the US while negotiating an EU trade deal, playing both sides."

The synthesis, and it is coherent. The lane is bullish on Chinese electric vehicles as a category — cheaper, better, taking share, exporting — and specifically bearish on BYD's ECONOMICS. Those are not contradictory: a company can win the market and lose the returns, and a 49% four-year revenue compound rate followed by a 2.83% operating margin and CNY 94.7 billion of cash burn is precisely what that looks like. The knowledge base predicted the second half of that sentence eight months before the accounts confirmed it.

Attribution. ONE hit comes from the jensen_huang channel, which is MANAGEMENT for a different registrant, and is excluded from the conviction pool and quoted at half weight. Channel distribution across the 45 raw hits: bill_gurley 6, geopolitical_cousins 5, money_of_mine 4, andreas_steno 3, we_study_billionaires 3, dwarkesh 3, dylan_patel 3, anthony_pompliano_show 3, forward_guidance 2, jensen_huang 2, no_priors 2, real_vision 2 and seven with one each. No channel reaches a third of the lane, so no concentration sensitivity test is triggered. No claim carries a management speaker_role for this registrant — which is unsurprising, since BYD's management does not appear in any English-language channel in this store.

Conclusion. Breadth 5, claim count 9, net conviction negative-low. The Synthos knowledge base is bullish on Chinese electric vehicles and bearish on BYD's margins, and the margin claim has been confirmed by the data. On a name where the financial file cannot be verified against any filing, that is the most reliable evidence in this dive.

7. Verdict, kill-criteria and flip conditions

Avoid.

The distinction this verdict rests on should be stated plainly, because it is easy to misread. This is not a judgement that BYD is a bad company. BYD may be one of the most consequential industrial companies of this decade: vertically integrated across batteries, semiconductors and vehicles, employing 869,622 people, spending CNY 58 billion a year on research, and — on the testimony of several independent voices in our knowledge base — making products that are "cheaper, better-equipped and technologically ahead of Western models." The verdict is that THIS SECURITY cannot be responsibly underwritten from the evidence available.

Four reasons, in order of weight.

First, there are no filings. No 10-K, no 10-Q, no 8-K, no auditor's report, nothing. Across the eleven other names in this batch, reading the filing caught a vendor error every single time — a 101% revenue gross-up, a $4 billion net-cash-versus-net-debt inversion, a quarterly revenue figure 43.5% too low, an entire missing metric class. Here the errors are visible and unresolvable: a debt total 94% below the sum of its own components, two implied exchange rates, an isAdr flag reading FALSE, a depreciation line of zero, two conflicting future earnings dates, and a composite rating that awards 5 out of 5 for discounted cash flow to a company that burned CNY 94.7 billion.

Second, the business is deteriorating and the deterioration is recent. Fiscal 2025 revenue −0.6%, gross margin −440 basis points to 15.04%, operating income −56.7%, earnings per share −24.1%. March 2026 quarter: revenue −11.8%, operating income −34.8%, net income −55.4%, earnings per share −56.7%. Free cash flow of minus CNY 94,660.5 million; total debt up 168%; inventory up 19.4% on falling revenue; working capital negative CNY 89.6 billion.

Third, the instrument itself is a risk. An unsponsored depositary receipt, traded OTC, with an unverifiable conversion ratio, approximately $3.1 million of daily turnover, and a last print eight and a half minutes before the close. A holder has no reporting rights, no proxy, and no recourse to a sponsor.

Fourth, there is no usable outside opinion. One analyst. One target. $42, with identical high, low, mean and median — 252% above the market and inconsistent with every multiple in the file. Three analysts on the earnings estimate that the entire valuation rests on.

Pre-registered REVERSAL conditions — what would make this analysable, in order:

Pre-registered CONFIRMATION criteria — what would make this a durable Avoid:

Where BYDDY fits in the Synthos Framework Portfolio. No position, and none contemplated while the security remains non-reporting. It is not placed on the watch list with a price trigger, because a price trigger would imply that at some price the analysis becomes reliable, and it does not — the constraint is the evidence, not the valuation. The trigger is a filing. Sizing note, for completeness: even on a favourable view, an OTC line with $3.1 million of daily turnover cannot absorb a meaningful position without moving the price, which is a second and independent reason this name does not belong in a model portfolio. Logged as a tracked Synthos call (Avoid) as of 2026-08-04 at $11.94, with the fair-value anchors and the reversal conditions gradeable — and with the explicit note that a bull outcome here would not invalidate the reasoning, because the objection is to the evidence base rather than to the company.

Single biggest risk to this verdict, stated because Avoid is the tier most likely to be wrong. BYD may be the most important industrial company in this batch. The knowledge base's independent lane says Chinese electric vehicles are technologically ahead and taking share globally; the company spends CNY 58 billion a year on research; it is vertically integrated in a way no Western automaker matches; and its revenue compounded at 49% a year for four years before this reversal. If fiscal 2025 was a price war that ends and margins revert to 19%, the earnings power at 16.1 times the FY2027 consensus is substantial, and the bull case in Section 5 is 41.5% above the current price. What we are saying is narrower and we hold it firmly: we cannot check a single number in this file against a single document, the numbers we can see show a 440-basis-point margin collapse and CNY 94.7 billion of cash burn, and the one independent voice that named this company predicted exactly that. Under those conditions the correct action is not to own it.

Provenance & disclosures